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NOTE
TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY: FEDERAL COURT REVIEW
OF TRIBAL COURT DECISIONS-JUDICIAL
INTRUSION INTO TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY
M. Allen Core*
Background
In the latest developments concerning the authority of tribes to
self-govern, the United States Supreme Court has moved closer to
a position that allows the federal judiciary to act as appellate
courts for decisions of tribal courts. In National Farmers Union
Insurance Co. v. Crow Tribe,' the Supreme Court concluded that
the question of whether the tribal forum had jurisdiction over a
dispute involving non-Indians was an issue encompassed within
the jurisdiction of federal courts by 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982).2
The Court also held that a tribal court should be able to deter-
mine its own jurisdictional limits through the normal court pro-
cesses.' The Court found that before a federal court could review
the issue of whether tribal court jurisdiction had been exceeded,
all tribal remedies must be exhausted.'
However, the Court also wrote that it
[did] not suggest that exhaustion would be required where an
assertion of tribal jurisdiction "is motivated by a desire to
harass or is conducted in bad faith" . . . or where the action is
patently violative of express jurisdictional prohibitions, or
where exhaustion would be futile because of the lack of an ade-
quate opportunity to challenge the court's jurisdiction.'
This part of the opinion concerned the possibility that a tribe
would assert jurisdiction simply to harass or assert jurisdiction in
bad faith. The action referred to by the Court was the actual
assertion of jurisdiction. However, the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals in Superior Oil Co. v. United States' used this language
* Third year law student. University of Oklahoma College of Law.
I. 471 U.S. 845 (1985).
2. Id. at 857.
3. Id. at 856.
4. Id. at 856-57.
5. Id. at n.21. quoting Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 338 (1977) (emphasis added).
6. 798 F.2d 1324 (10th Cir. 1986).
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from National Farmers to reverse a district court decision that
had granted a dismissal based on the sovereign immunity of the
Navajo Nation.' The appellate court
remand[ed] to the District Court with instruction to undertake
such further proceedings deemed necessary to determine
whether the actions of the Navajo Tribe of Indians and the
named individual Navajo defendants in withholding consent to
assignments of leases and requests for seismic permits were
taken in bad faith or motivated by a desire to harass such as to
render exhaustion of Navajo Tribal Court remedies futile.'
The Navajo Tribe, as landowner, has the right to approve or
not approve leases, lease assignments, or seismic permits' This
right is no less outside the Court's review than the action, or inac-
tion, taken by the Superintendent of the Uintah and Ouray
Agency of the Bureau of Indian Affairs in not approving com-
munitization agreements in Kenai Oil & Gas v. United States."0
These actions of the Navajo Tribe were ministerial and had
nothing to do with Navajo Tribal Court jurisdiction. This in-
dicates that the Tenth Circuit has taken the rule laid down by the
Supreme Court in National Farmers and expanded it to allow the
federal district court to review actions of tribal officials. This ex-
pansion of the rule allows the federal district courts to decide the
merits of the case, rather than limiting the federal courts to deter-
mining whether the tribal court exceeded its jurisdiction.
The most recent Supreme Court case in this field shows the
continued shift toward encroachment. In Iowa Mutual Insurance
Co. v. LaPlante," the Court was faced with the same scenario as
in National Farmers except the plaintiffs were alleging federal
jurisdiction on the basis of diversity of citizenship.' 2 This case in-
7 Id. at 1331 See also Federal Recent De.elopments. this i'sue
8. Id
9 25 U.S.C § 396a 396g (1982)
10 671 F.2d 383 (10th Cir 1982) In Ainat the Superintendent re!u.,ed to approse a
communitization form that would have preented leases o%'ned b,. Kenai Oi and others
from expiring for lack of production at the end ol the prinar term ol the leases- The
Superintendent defended his action on the basis that leting the leae expire and releasing
the land with bontis money and higher royalt) rate. %%a, in the economic best interci of the
iribe. The court did not cons der this action a% arbuirar) and di'greed that the Superinten-
dent was acting in had faith to obsirut lease operation,.
It 1075 Ci 971 11987)
12 ld at 974-75. claiming under 28 U S C 1332 (1982)
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volved an Indian injured on the Blackfeet Reservation while
working for a non-Indian farming operation. The plaintiff in the
case was the operator's insurer.
The injured worker sued in tribal court to recover from the in-
surance company. When the tribal court ruled that the case was
within its jurisdiction, Iowa Mutual filed its collateral case in
federal district court, rather than complete the tribal court pro-
cess. The insurance company alleged that the tribal court had no
jurisdiction to hear the case, and the district court agreed. The
court of appeals reversed, holding that the federal district court
had no jurisdiction.
Instead of remanding he case to the district court and requir-
ing the insurance company to exhaust all tribal remedies, as was
done in National Farmers, the Court added language that may
show the future trend. Speaking of National Farmers, the Court
wrote that "[w]e refused to foreclose tribal court jurisdiction
over a civil dispute involving a non-Indian."'" This sounds as if
the question of tribal court jurisdiction over non-Indians in civil
matters was questionable but was saved by the Court.
The Court "remanded the case to the District Court to deter-
ne whether the federal action should be dismissed or stayed
pending exhaustion of the remedies available in the tribal court
system.'"" Then the Court added the following footnote: "As the
Court's directions on remand in National Farmers Union in-
dicate, the exhaustion rule enunciated in National Farmers Union
did not deprive the federal courts of subject-matter jurisdiction.
Exhaustion is required as a matter of comity, not as a jurisdic-
tional prerequisite."''
In choosing' this language the Court was analogizing to the
relationship between federal and state courts.' 6 This ana,-gy
simply does not hold up under the constitutional authority
granted to the federal courts under article Ill, section 2, which
states in part that the judicial power extends to controversies aris-
ing between citizens of different states. The Court itself points
out that under Cherokee Nation v. Georgia," tribes were not
states at the time that language in the Constitution was
11 471 V' at 855
14 !07 S Ci. at 976
15 hi n.8
I6 Id
F 10 U' S (5 Pet.) I (1131)
NOTENo. 21
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approved.'" The Court also points out that "Congress has
amended the diversity statute several times since the development
of tribal judicial systems, but ...has never expressed any intent
to limit the civil jurisdiction of the tribal courts."' 9 Although the
Court goes through an analysis of why the tribal court has
jurisdiction,2" it does not explain how a federal court might have
concurrent jurisdiction.
While the Supreme Court has not presently decided to review
tribal court decisions, the opinion written by Justice Stevens, con-
curring in part and dissenting in part, demonstrates what may be
the direction of the Court. Justice Stevens wrote:
The deference given to the deliberations of Tribal Court on the
merits of a dispute, is a separate matter as to which National
Farmers Union offers no controlling precedent. Indeed, in
holding that exhaustion of the tribal jurisdiction issue was
necessary, we explicitly contemplated later federal court con-
sideration of the merits of the dispute.-"
In addition to these decisions, Charles F. Wilkinson, in
American Indians, Time, and the Law,22 has taken the position
that federal courts should have appellate review over cases in
tribal court that involve a right granted under the Indian Civil
Rights Act. 2" His reasoning for this position is that both Indians
and non-Indians residing on a reservation would feel more secure
about the fairness of the system, which would decrease conflicts
and dispel bad feelings between the tribes and the non-Indians on
the reservation." Although Wilkinson admits that this type of
review would be an intrusion into tribal sovereignty, he does not
state what gives the courts the right to intrude in this manner. He
states his conclusion and then goes on as if the courts simply have
that power. A study of the history of the relationship between the
tribal governments and the federal government will demonstrate
that federal courts do not have the constitutional authority to ex-
ercise that power.
IN 107 S Ct. at 977
19 Id
20 Id at 978
21 Id.
22 C Wit KINSON. AMERICAN Ijr)i "s TimF, N ) THE L AU (1987),
23 Id. at 115
24 Id. at 116
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Development of the Government-to-Government Relationship
Indian tribal governments existed before the European ex-
plorers came to this country. As the European nations occupied
the land, each in turn dealt with the tribal nations that were
already here." The importance of establishing relations with the
tribes was recognized by the new American government when the
Continental Congress established committees to deal with Indian
tribes. ' , When the United States Constitution was written, the
authority of the new government to deal with tribes was granted
to the Congress by article 1, section 8. No other governmental
unit was granted the power to deal with tribal governments in the
Constitution.
The relationship between the United States government and the
tribal governments was defined by the United States Supreme
Court in the opinions written by Chief Justice Marshall *n the early
1830s. In Cherokee Nation v. Georgia the Supr,-me Court
dismissed the case because it did not have jurisdiction to hear the
merits of the case." This decision was based on the determination
that the Cherokee Nation was not a foreign state within the
meaning of the constitutional provision that gave the Supreme
Court original jurisdiction over disputes between states and
foreign nations."
The following year, another case involving the Cherokee Na-
tion, Worcester v. Georgia," concerned the ability of the state of
Georgia to enforce its laws within the lands of the Cherokee Na-
tion. This time Marshall agreed to hear the case. The Chief
Justice held that:
[T]he political existence of the tribes continued after their rela-
tions with both the state and the federal government. As a con-
sequence of the tribes' relationship with the federal govern-
ment, tribal powers of self-government are limited by federal
statutes, by the terms of treaties with the federal government,
and by restraints implicit in the protectorate relationship itself.
In all other respects the tribes remain independent and self-
governing political communities."
25 F (CORE'S FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 50-5g (R Strickland et al. eds. 1982)
2 N at 58
2" 3 U , (5 Pet-) I (1831.
2, Id at 19
29 31. t .S (6 Pet.) 515 (IR32)
31) The cawe %a, summarwzed in F ('oRl'.. sulyra note 25, at 235.
No. 21 NOTE
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This concept of tribal self-government and sovereignty was em-
bodied in most of the treaties during the first century of the
United States' existence.' Although the treaty-making era of
dealing with Indian tribes ended in 1871,32 this concept of tribal
sovereignty continued. In an opinion by the Solicitor of the
Department of Interior in 1934, Solicitor Margold said:
[T]hose powers which are lawfully vested in an Indian tribe are
not, in general, delegated powers granted by express acts of
Congress, but rather inherent powers of a limited sovereignty
which have never been extinguished. Each Indian tribe begins
its relationship with the Federal Government as a sovereign
power, recognized as such in treaty and legislation. The powers
of sovereignty have been limited from time to time by special
treaties and laws designed to take from the Indian tribes con-
trol of matters which in the judgment of Congress, these tribes
could no longer be safely permitted to handle. The statutes of
Congress, then, must be examined to determine the limitations
of tribal sovereignty rather than to determine its sources or its
positive content. What is not expressly limited remains with the
domain of tribal sovereignfY.'"
The Supreme Court has recognized this concept beginning with
Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Worcester in which he termed
tribes as distinct but dependent sovereigns." This concept was
not recognized by the Court in 1886 in United States v.
Kagama," which only recognized two sovereignties, the federal
government and the state governments, but it was resurrected by
the Court in 1959 with the decision in Williams v. Lee.",
The doctrine of inherent tribal sovereignty was explicitly
recognized by the Court in United States v. Wheeler." In that
case the Court held that successive prosecutions of Indians in
tribal and federal courts were not barred by the double jeopardy
provision of the fifth amendment because each is a sovereign with
its own laws and jurisdiction." Referring to Wheeler, Charles F.
31 Id at 69
12 Act of Mar 3. 1871. ch. 20. 16 Sim 5-.4. 566
33 Op Sol M27781. 55 1 D, 1-4. 19 (25 Oct 1931) (emphasis added)
14. 31 U S. (6 Pei.) at 560-61
i5 11 U S 375 (1886)
16 358 U S 217 (1959)
17 45 U.S 313 (1978)
_t Id. at 329-30
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Wilkinson said, "The acceptance of the doctrine [of inherent
tribal sovereignty], and the renunciation of the concept that tribal
powers are delegated from the United States, lays the conceptual
outlines for the field." 39
The Supreme Court has used this doctrine many times during
the last few years. In Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, the
Court held that tribal powers are inherent and cannot be found
by looking at federal delegations." The Court in Merrion also
said that the tribes have regulatory authority because they are
governments, not just proprietors." In Santa Clara Pueblo v.
Martinez the Court held that the tribes are possessed with tribal
immunity from suit. 4 ' The Court also pointed out in Martinez
that the existence of tribes as governments depends on their own
will, not on any recognition by the United States.3 This doctrine
does not recogrize the ability of the federal courts to review tribal
court decisions, as was stated by the Court in Martinez." These
cases demonstrate that the United States Supreme Court, as well
as commentators, have recognized and utilized the concept of in-
herent tribal sovereignty to decide cases that have arisen on In-
dian reservations.
Tribal Sovereignty and the Indian Civil Rights Act
Most of the limitations on the powers of the federal and state
governments that were intended to protect the civil rights of its
citizens were contained in the first fourteen amendments to the
United States Constitution. However, these limitations were
placed on Congress or the states and did not mention Indian
tribes or tribal members. Except for acts pertaining to specific
tribes, Indians did not become citizens of the United States until
1924.'
The question arose as to whether persons under the jurisdiction
of a tribe were protected by the amendments. The answer came
from the Supreme Court in Talton v. Mayes." The Court in
39 C kk it xiNso%. sipra note 22. at 62
40 455 US 130. 141 (1982)
d1 Id at 144-48
42 436 U S49. 58 (1978).
43 Id at 56_
44 Id at 66-70
45 8 U S C_ k 1401(b) (1982)
46 163US 37611X96)
No. 21 NOTE
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Talton held that the tribes were independent sovereigns free of
constitutional constraints and general federal laws unless Con-
gress had expressly limited their powers. For this reason the
Court held that they were not limited by the grand jury require-
ment of the fifth and fourteenth amendments.' Subsequent cases
have held that neither the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment"3 nor the freedom of religion clause of the first
amendment apply as limitations to Indian tribes."
This situation continued unchanged even through the height of
the civil rights movement of the early sixties, when the tribes were
not included in the Civil Rights Act of 1964.0 The limitation on
tribal governments to protect the rights Qf individuals within the
jurisdiction of the tribes was not formally addressed until the
passage of the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968.1 '
For ten years following the passage of the Indian Civil Rights
Act, persons who felt they had their protected rights violated by a
tribe and were not satisfied with the tribal court determination
customarily took their actions to federal district court." This is
much like the scenario envisioned by Wilkinson. However, this
process of district court review of tribal court determinations was
renounced by the Court in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez." In
that case the original plaintiff, Ms. Martinez, had sought to have
her children enrolled as members of the Santa Clara Pueblo
Tribe. Without membership status, the children were ineligible to
inherit their mother's property. The Santa Clara Pueblo has a
patrilineal society, which means children are members of their
father's pueblo. Since in this case the father was a member of the
Navajo Nation, the children could not, under tribal custom,
become members of the Santa Clara Pueblo. If the mother had
been a Navajo and the father a member of the pueblo, the
children could have been enrolled. That the children were raised
47 Id at 384-85
4S See alio Tin Cities Chippe.,a Tribal Council Minnesota Chippe.,a Tribe. 370
F 2d 529(10th Cir 1959).
49 See alwi Na ie Am .Church . Na'alo Tribal (ouncit. 272 F.2d 131 (10th Ci
1959)
q' C%i Rights Act of 1964.42 U S.C 1981 -200Xh-6 (1982)
51 25 U S C 1301-03 (1982)
52 Crovwe % Eastern Band of Cherokee Indian,. 506 F 2d 1231 (4th Cir 1974).
Laramie % Nicholson. 48' F 2d 315 (9th Cir ). cert dieined. 419 U S 871 (19'73) While
Feather One Feather. 478 Fr2d 1311 (8th Cir, 1971): t onca s;ion .. Leekity. 334 F. Supp
370(D N M 1971). Dodge % Nakai. 298 F Supp 17(D Ariz 1968)
53 436 U S 40 (19"78)
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at the pueblo and spoke the Pueblo language, did not change the
custom. When Ms. Martinez was unable to get her desired deci-
sion in the tribal forum, she brought action in federal district
court to force the pueblo to enroll her children.
This case represented the type of interest the Indian Civil
Rights Act (ICRA) was meant to protect. This was a sex-
discrimination case, and the ICRA required that tribes provide
equal protection under the law." The district court held that it
had subject matter jurisdiction," w":!ch was affirmed by the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, although the court reversed on
the merits. ,
The Supreme Court reversed both courts on the issue of
jurisdiction and, for that reason, did not reach the merits of the
case." The opinion was a glowing pronouncement of tribal
sovereignty and self-government. The Court held that "providing
a federal forum for issues arising under § 1302 [of the ICRA]
constitutes an interference with tribal autonomy and self-
government," and the Court would not interfere without express
manifestation of congressional intent." The Court found that
"nothing on the face of Title I of the ICRA purports to subject
tribes to the jurisdiction of the federal courts for injunctive or
declaratory relief.""
After an exhaustive study of the legislative history of the
ICRA, the Court found "[tihe legislative history of Title I sug-
gests that Congress' failure to provide remedies other than
habeas corpus was a deliberate one. '"" The Court held that:
Creation of a federal cause of action for the enforcement of
rights created in Title I, however useful it might be in securing
compliance with §1302, plainly would be at odds with the con-
gressional goal of protecting ttibal self-government. . . . Tribal
courts have repeatedly been recognized as appropriate forums
for the exciusive adjudication of disputes affecting important
personal and property interests of both Indians and non-
Indians. . . . Congress considered and rejected proposals for
54 25 L' SC § 1302(8) (1982)
ii 'artne.z. 402 F Supp 5 (D.N-M 1975)
56 540 F.2d 1039 (10th Cir 1976)
7 .116 U S at 72
58. Id at 59
56 Id
60 Id. at 61
NOTENo0. 211
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federal review of alleged violations of the Act arising in a civil
context."
The Court closed its opinion with language that left no linger-
ing questions concerning tribal inherent sovereignty, the role of
tribal forums, and the role of the United States Supreme Court.
The Court ruled:
[Wie ha,,e . . . recognized that the tribes remain quasi-
sovereign nations which, by government structure, culture and
source of sovereignty are in many ways foreign to the constitu-
tional institutions of the Federal and State Governments ...
[U]nless and until Congress 'Makes clear its intention to permit
the additional intrusion on tribal sovereignty that adjudication
of such actions in a federal forum would represent, we are con-
strained to find that § 1302 does not impliedly authorize ac-
tions for declaratory or injunctive relief against either the tribe
or its officers."
The Court thus recognized its 'inited role in the government-
to-government relationship between the tribes and the federal
government. The Court also recognized that the tribes at one time
enjoyed the full spectrum of sovereign powers. The tribes have
given up some external and internal aspects of that sovereignty,
by treaty initially, and then have had those powers limited by
Congress. But since "[gleneral acts of Congress [do] not apply to
Indians, unless expressed as to clearly manifest an intention to in-
clude them," the Court is without power to do what the United
States Congress has failed to do.'
How then, in the face of such explicit authority, can one con-
sider federal court intrusion on tribal sovereignty without con-
gressional action? Furthermore, how can Wilkinson put forth
support for such policy without noting or suggesting that legisla-
tion be enacted to allow the courts to review such cases?
The Demise of True Sovereignty
The answer to these questions depends on whether inherent
tribal sovereignty actually exists. A reader of Supreme Court opi-
nions would say it must, because the Court has used the term
61 Id ai 64-65. 61 (emphasi added)
62 Id al 71.72.
61, Elk '. Wilkin' 112 US 94. 100 (188.1)
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mhen deciding case four times in five years." + But if it exists, why
does it not set the limits of interference from state and federal
governments? How can the Court justify balancing tribal,
federal, and state inter.,sts? If, as Justice Stevens claims in his
dissent in Iowa Mutual, under the majority opinion tribal
sovereignty is entitled to greater deference than so-called state
sovereignty, ' how is a state able to go onto a reservation and
regulate tribal activities.' or to require the tribes to collect taxes
from non-Indians on sales made on the reservation?6"
The Court may have an answer to this, but if so, the answer is
not found in the Constitution nor in any' acts of Congress. Con-
gress has never stated that tribes do not possess sovereignty. Ex-
cept for specific instances, such as Public Law 280," ° Congress
has never authorized direct regulation by states on the reserva-
tion. Congress has never authorized the states to require tribes to
collect taxes on sales to non-Indians. If Congress did not
authorize these things, %here is that authorization found? The
answer must be that the United States Supreme Court is doing
this on its own in excess of the authority granted to it in the
United States Constitution.
The basis for the current Court's handling of tribal soereignty
goes back to 1882 in United States v. McBratne,'" where, at the
height of the assimilation era of congressional Indian policy, the
Court upheld state jurisdiction over the murder of one non-
Indian by another non-Indian on a reservation. As Wilkinson
points out, there was no statutory authority for this decision.-'
Under the Indian Country Crimes Act -such a crime should be
tried in federal court." This, however, did not deter the Court
from allowing the state to exercise jurisdiction on the reservation,
The Court's justification was that "some events occur in Indian
64 Io%,a %lut Ins. Co % La IPlan Ie. o- . ci 971 (1987): National I-arrn'r, I nion
In, to % (rov, Tribe. 471 US 845 (1985). Rice % Rehner, 463 I S 13 (19831. Ne,
c1,o % M scaler' o Apache rnbe. 462 t' Q 124 ()981)
65 158 U S at 220-
66 10' (1 aK 985
67 Rice v Rehner. 463 US I 1198 1)
68 Washington confederated Tribe\ oI c.oil'i Indian Reersanon. 447 1 S 11
69' 1W of *\ue 15. 193 Lh 50l5 6- \,ii is
'0 IM I' S 622 (i8M2),
S ( X\ iI Ki% O'.%. lupra note 22. ii
-2 ISt''-( " , 152 1982)
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country that simply do not bear on legitimate tribal or federal
concerns."' The Court seems to be saying that Indian tribal
governments and tribal and federal law enforcement agencies
should not be concerned about protecting the peace on the reser-
vation as long as non-Indians are killing non-Indians. To indicate
that tribal governments should not be concerned when violent
crimes occur on the reservation is totally ludicrous. No one would
question the absurdity of a statement that a state should not be
concerned when a noncitizen kills another noncitizen within its
borders.
Justice Black relied on the drcision in McBratney to write his
opinion in New York ex rel. Ray v. Martin," which involved the
power of the state of New York to extend its criminal laws to In-
dians while on the Allegheny Reservation. Referring to
McBratnev, Black wrote, "That case and others which followed
it all held that in the absence of a limiting treaty obligation or
Congressional enactment each state had a right to exercise
jurisdiction over Indian reservations within its boundaries.""
With judicial slight of hand, Black ignores the fact that
McBratnev, even if decided correctly, only pertained to particular
states whose enabling acts did not reserve jurisdictio!i to the
federal government and to the tribes. Furthermore, this apparent
"presumption of state jurisdiction seems entirely inconsistent
with Worcester v. Georgia," which is still good law.
As noted earlier, the concept of tribal sovereignty was resur-
rected by the Supreme Court in Williams v. Lee," ironically writ-
ten by Justice Black. In Williams, Justice Black completely
reversed his prior position in Ray and wrote: "Congress has acted
consistently upon the assumption that the States have no power
to regulate the affairs of Indians on a reservation. . . [W]hen
Congress has wished the States to exercise this power it has ex-
pressly granted them the jurisdiction."'"
But the damage had been done, for even in Williams v. Lee the
Court did not exclude state jurisdiction because the tribe is a
separate sovereign, but because the Court wanted to protect tribal
73- C Wit mINSo ,.upra note 22. at 88
74 326 U.S 496 (1946)
75 Id at 497.98
76 R BRsii & J H -I M .o%. I tit Rol I145 19O )
"77 158U S 217 1959)
'8 /I at 220-21,222 23 W u. , R_ B i i Vt & I tit ' . urr not: -6. at 1-9
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self-government." M Therefore, sovereignty, in the true sense of the
word, does not exist for tribes in the opinion of the United States
Supreme Court. It appears that the ability of Indian tribes to
govern within the boundaries of the reservation depends not only
on the United States Congress, which has constitutional authority
to deal with Indian tribes, but also on the current whim of the
United States Supreme Court, which lacks any constitutional
authority to exercise authority over tribes.
Tribal SovereigntY in the Current Era
The first significant indication of the downfall of the true
sovereignty came in 1978 in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian
Tribe." The Court in that case refused to recognize the authority
of the tribe to exercise criminal jurisdiction ,,er non-Indians for
acts committed while on the reservation." The facts of that case
showed that the Suquamish Reservation had been allotted for
some time. The population of non-Indians and the land holdings
of non-Indians far exceeded the population and land holdings of
the tribe and its members. In order for the Court to prevent a
small minority to have authority over a nonvoting majority, the
Court could not decide the case on tribal sovereignty. Therefore,
the Court rejected the concept of tribal sovereignty in favor of
the power of the United States to protect its citizens from unwar-
ranted intrusions on their personal liberty." :
However, as pointed out in the dissent written by Justice Mar-
shall and joined by Chief Justice Berger,
"[P]ower to preserve order on the reservation . . . is a sine qua
non of the sovereignty that the Suquamish originally
possessed." . . . In the absence of affirmative withdrawal by
treaty or statute, I am of the view that Indian tribes enjoy as a
necessary aspect of their retained sovereignty the right to try
and punish all persons who commit offenses against tribal law
within the reservation.'
This view strongly contrasts with the one of Justice Rehnquist,
who wrote that "[b]y submitting to the overriding sovereignty of
79 C Wi KSON. supra note 22. at 133 n.2
80 435 U S 191 (1978)
XI Id at 210-12
82 Id at 211)
X3 Id at 212. quoting Oliphant %v Schhe. 544 F-2d 1007. 1009 (9th Cir 1976).
No. 21 ,VOTE
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the United States, Indian tribes . . . give up the;r power to try
non-Indian citizens . .. except in a manner acceptable to Con-
gress. '"14 After considering two reasons why tribes may want
jurisdiction over non-Indians. Rehnquist also stated that "these
are considerations for Congress to weigh in deciding whether In-
dian tribes should finally be authorized to try non-Indians.""
Obviously. the now Chief Justice Rehnquist sees tribal authority
as something that Congress must bestow on tribes, rather than
something that tribes possess because they are sovereign entities.
This opinion also makes a statement that brings the current
thinking of the Court into sharp focus and allows the Court to
exercise power to do away with tribal sovereignty. Rehnquist
wrote: "ITIhe tribes' retained powers are not such that they are
limited only by specific restrictions in treaties or congressional
enactments. As the Court of Appeals recognized, Indian tribes
are prohibited from exercising both those autonomous states that
are expressly terminated by Congress and those powers 'inconsis-
lent with iheir status'.-" This would allow the courts to deter-
mine what powers a tribe mas exercise, rather than having those
powers determined by the tribe's sovereignty.
Oliphant was followed by a case directly on point with the
main thrust of this paper. In Dry Creek Lodge v. Arapahoe &
Shoshone Tribes there was a dispute between a non-Indian who
had property on the reservation and an Indian family whose land
had to be crossed to get to the non-Indian land." The dispute
arose when the tribes cut access to the non-Indian's land at the
request of the Indian family. The plaintiff sued the tribes, claim-
ing his constitutional rights had been violated. The tribal court
refused to accept the case without the approval of the tribal coun-
cil, which was not given.
The plaintiff then brought the case in federal court. The trial
court originally dismissed for want of jurisdiction. The Tenth
Circuit reversed and remanded for a trial on the damages. Before
the case was finally resolved at the trial court level, the Supreme
Court decided Martinez." The district court then again disnissed
for want of jurisdiction. The court reasoned that since the case
8-1 , 5 'S at 210
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was brought under the ICRA and since the Supreme Court had
just held that federal courts do not have jurisdiction to hear cases
under the ICR N, the court did not have jurisdiction to hear that
case. 9
But the Tenth Circuit again reversed, using Oliphant for
authority rather than Aartinez." Although this was a circuit
court case, the Supreme Court denied a writ of certiorari." It is
submitted that in this case, we see the beginning of the answer to
the mystery of tribal sovereignty and how the Supreme Court will
deal with it under the ICRA. The appeals court distinguished the
Court's decision by pointing out that:
[Martinez] was entirely an internal matter concerning tribal
members and a matter of very great importance to the individ-
uals. . . . The problem was thus strictly an internal one be-
tween tribal members and the tribal government relating to the
policy of the Tribe as to its membership. Of course, there were
no non-Indians concerned."
How the fact that there were non-Indians involved in Dry
Creek Lodge impacted on the sovereign right of an Indian tribe
to handle disputes within the boundaries of the reservation was
not given adequate analysis by the court. However, the court did
say: "The reason for the [Martinez position by the Supreme
Court] disappears when the issue relates to a matter ouside of in-
ternal tribal affairs and when it concerns an issue 'with a non-
Indian."'" There is no basis given for this position nor any
authority cited to substantiate the statement. The Supreme Court
allowed the opinion to stand, giving, at least indirectly, its bless-
ing to the position of the appeals court.
The theory of Oliphant next arose in In re Sandmar," a
bankruptcy case in which the Navajo Tribe was a creditor. In this
case, the Navajo Tribe did not answer to a charge filed by the
debtor in bankruptcy court and was cited for contempt. The
court rejected the defense of tribal sovereignty immunity, which
was held to exist by the Supreme Court in .lartinez.9 ' The court
89 623 F 2d at 683
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wrote that sovereignty was limited because "[the) matter is not
'internal' as it involves the rights of a non-member Debtor and
the rights of other creditors. It is not essential to self-government
as it involves creditor-debtor (contractual) relationships."" 6
The similarities running through these three cases are: (1) both
an Indian tribe or tribal member and non-Indian are involved, and
(2) the non-Indian had not consented to the exercise of tribal in-
herent sovereign powers upon him. But why does a person have to
consent to jurisdiction in order to have the government exercise
authority over him? This is obviously not true of an Indian who
travels off the reservation. In that case there would be no question
that the state could exercise jurisdiction over the Indian. In an arti-
cle by Kevin Gover and Robert Laurence the authors examine
these three cases and conclude that: "The 'unwarranted intru-
sions' exception of Oliphant threatens to swallow the principle of
inherent sovereignty."' " The authors probably meant that non-
Indian involvement will be the key to whether sovereignty is used
by the Court to rule for the tribe, or whether sovereignty is limited
by the Court to decide against the tribe.
This position is strengthened by the line of cases decided by the
Supreme Court on the sale of cigarettes.9Y These cases hold that if
the incidence of the state excise tax on the sale of cigarettes falls on
the consumer, the state may require the Indian retailer on the
reservation to collect and account for the taxes on sales to
nonmembers of the tribe."9 This is so even if the tribe is assessing
its own tax on the sale of cigarettes. " The tribe would not have to
collect the state tax on sales to its own members.' 1
To be able to enforce this requirement, the states will have to be
able to require the Indian or tribal retailer to keep sales to
nonmembers separate from sales to members, to inspect the
records of the Indian retailer on the reservation, and to actually
96 12 Bankr 910. 914 (Bankr D.N N1 1981)
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collect the tax from the retailer.' 2 The problems raised if a tribe is
the retailer are particularly acute because the Supreme Court has
held that tribes have sovereign immunity, ' and states do not have
warrant authority on reservations.'"4
The Court will probably support the states in this regard
because the matter does not involve only the tribe and its
members. The tribe or Indian retailers, the state, and non-Indian
purchasers of cigarettes are all involved. Therefore, the Supreme
Court can use the precedent outlined in In re Sandmar to find that
sovereign immunity has been limited by implication.I' This means
that the Court can decide that sovereignty has been limited, rmther
than Congress actually legislating a limitation.
Analysis
Much of this paper has been devoted to discussion of issues not
directly related to federal court review of tribal court decisions. In
order to acquire a proper understanding of what the Court may do
in the future, however, one must understand what the Court is do-
ing in the field of Indian law generally.
In every case the Supreme Court decides involving Indian issues,
the terms "sovereignty" or "inherent sovereignty" are used when
discussing the powers of Indian tribes. There seems to be no ques-
tion that when the parties to a dispute are tribal members or the
tribe and its members, the tribe has all of the attributes of
sovereignty not limited by Congress. Should a case arise under the
Indian Civil Rights Act that does not involve any nonmembers,
Martinez will control and the federal courts will not have jurisdic-
tion to review the decision.
As recently as February 25, 1987, the Supreme Court wrote the
following:
The Court has consistently recognized that Indian tribes retain
"attributes of sovereignty over both their members and their
territory," and that "tribal sovereignty is dependent on, and
subordinate to, only the Federal Government not the States." It
102. Id
103 'Iartnez, 436 U S ai 58
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is clear, however, that state laws may be applied to tribal Indians
on their reservations if Congress has expressly so provided.' °6
Unfortunately, rather than stopping at this quotation, the
Court decided the case in favor of the tribes because the interests
of the tribes outweighed the interests of the state." ' The implica-
tion of the last sentence of the quote above is that if Congress does
not expressly so provide, then state laws may not be applied to
tribal Indians on their reservations. This would be a statement of
true inherent tribal sovereignty, and the Court could have decided
the case simply on that point. But the case involved more parties
than the tribes and their members. Therefore, the Court did not
use tribal sovereignty to decide the case even though it purported
to recognize the concept.
This, then, is the manner in which the Court may decide to
review tribal court decisions on the merits. A case might arise
under the Indian Civil Rights Act involving a non-Indian defen-
dant and an Indian tribe. Rather than allowing tribal sovereignty
and Martinez to set the limits of federal court jurisdiction, the
Court may follow the Oliphant line of cases and ignore sovereign-
ty. This is probably what Wilkinson was considering when he took
the position advocating federal court review. As a believer in the
inherent powers of tribal governments, this author cannot concede
to the federal judiciary the constitutional right to do so without
congressional action. Gover and Laurence indicate that perhaps a
limited federal court review may happen, but they at least
recognize that congressional action is necessary.' "" If the Supreme
Court would also recognize this fact, then it would be giving more
than lip service to the concept of tribal sovereignty and the con-
stitutionally mandated separation of powers.
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